A Distributed Satisfactory Content Delivery Scheme for QoS Provisioning
  in Delay Tolerant Networks by Ezzahidi, Sidi Ahmed et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
60
8.
05
30
8v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  1
8 A
ug
 20
16
A Distributed Satisfactory Content Delivery Scheme
for QoS Provisioning in Delay Tolerant Networks
Sidi Ahmed Ezzahidi
LIMIARF,
University of Mohammed V,
B.P. 1014 RP, Rabat, Morocco
sa.ezzahidi@gmail.com
Essaid Sabir
UBICOM Research Group,
ENSEM, Hassan II
University of Casablanca, Morocco.
e.sabir@ensem.ac.ma
Mounir Ghogho
School of Electronic and Electrical Engineering,
University of Leeds,
United Kingdom
m.ghogho@leeds.ac.uk
Abstract—We deal in this paper with the content forwarding
problem in Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs). We first formulate
the content delivery interaction as a non-cooperative satisfaction
game. On one hand, the source node seeks to ensure a delivery
probability above some given threshold. On the other hand, the
relay nodes seek to maximize their own payoffs. The source
node offers a reward (virtual coins) to the relay which caches
and forwards the file to the final destination. Each relay faces
the dilemma of accepting/rejecting to cache the source’s file.
Cooperation incurs energy cost due to caching, carrying and
forwarding the source’s file. Yet, when a relay accepts to
cooperate, it may receive some reward if it succeeds to be the
first relay to forward the content to the destination. Otherwise,
the relay may receive some penalty in the form of a constant
regret; the latter parameter is introduced to make incentive
for cooperation. Next, we introduce the concept of Satisfaction
Equilibrium (SE) as a solution concept to the induced game.
Now, the source node is solely interested in reaching a file
delivery probability greater than some given threshold, while the
relays behave rationally to maximize their respective payoffs. Full
characterizations of the SEs for both pure and mixed strategies
are derived. Furthermore, we propose two learning algorithms
allowing the players (source/relays) to reach the SE strategies.
Finally, extensive numerical investigations and some learning
simulations are carried out to illustrate the behaviour of the
interacting nodes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, self-organizing is tremendously becoming a key
feature for current and future mobile networking. Moreover,
numerous new applications and some special circumstances
require the nodes/network to be self-organizing, self-
configuring and self-healing. In order to overcome extreme
circumstances (earthquakes, disasters, ...), massive access to
the network (sport events, festival, ...) or lack of infrastructure
in general, a class of self-organizing networks called Delay
Tolerant Networks (DTN) [5] has been proposed and are
continuously gaining interest. A DTN is a class of an
infrastructure-less and fully distributed wireless networks.
Such a network is designed to operate over arbitrary distances,
including very small scale (e.g., cells communications) to
ultra large scale (e.g., interplanetary communications).
Intermittent connectivity and an excessively large delay may
occur very often in such an environment, which makes the
end-to-end connectivity a very challenging issue. Thus, the
use of store-carry-forward paradigm seems to be an attractive
solution. The main idea here is to exploit the opportunistic
inter-contacts between relay nodes to cache-and-forward
given data to the final destination.
DTNs-based applications are very various [7], including
digital communication for rural areas (e.g., DarkNet,
TrainNet, KioskNet, etc.), personal/wildlife communications
(e.g., Pollen, Body Area Networks, ZebraNet, etc.), battlefield
communications (e.g., Military Missions and Airborne
Networks) disaster rescues and environmental monitoring
communications. Moreover, delay tolerant networks could
be an attractive/efficient solution to offload legacy networks.
They may help out to control the congestion caused
by the exponential growth of traffic, heterogeneity in
infrastructure/technologies (Device-to-Device, RFID, Drone-
based backhaul, etc.), see Fig.1. Moreover, they are expected
to be a part of the next generation radio communication
system such as 4G LTE-Advanced networks, 5G and Internet
of Things (IoT) [19], [15]. We recall also the “Any Time, Any
Where, Any Device” (ATAWAD) paradigm which has been
fueled by the prevalence of devices, exploiting collaboration
between devices, enhancing functionalities and speeding up
the access to data. Technically, DTNs can be helpful to assist
data transmission to/from isolated regions where connectivity
is hard or even impossible to establish. Moreover, the DTNs
devices could be efficient to enhance Quality of Service
(QoS) and to reduce energy consumption by strategically
offloading the traffic from the network backbone. However,
getting nodes in the network to cooperate and act as relays
is a still fundamental challenge, due to limited bandwidth,
limited battery energy and limited storage capacity. Indeed,
participating in data transmission and content caching incurs
energy consumption. Therefore, the relays may exhibit a
selfish behavior, which significantly degrades the DTNs
performance. The latter is a key motivation to develop and
deploy efficient and distributed mechanisms to solve the
inherent cooperation issue.
In order to evaluate the network performance, several
metrics can be utilized. For instance, one can use the delivery
rate, the content loss rate, the protocols overhead, the end-
to-end delay, the expected number of transmissions and the
Fig. 1. DTN communications over Device-to-Device communications.
energy consumed. Here we consider optimizing the energy
consumption subject to the average delivery rate being above
some given threshold. In other words, this work is devoted to
presenting a new fully distributed framework for QoS support
in DTN-like networks.
Self-configuring capability and the distributed nature of
DTNs are proven to induce selfish behaviour at nodes level,
see [11], [12], [13]. Several incentive mechanisms have been
designed to sustain cooperation among selfish relay nodes.
Game theory seems to be the perfect tool to design such
mechanisms. It is mainly viewed as a tool to investigate
the decision-making by the system through an equilibrium
analysis instead of optimality analysis. The authors in [10]
presented an interesting survey on incentive mechanisms for
DTNs. They compared four schemes: 1) virtual currency based
incentive mechanism, 2) credit-based incentive mechanism,
3) game-theory-based incentive mechanism and 4) combined
incentive mechanism. In [9], the authors discussed different
game theoretical-inspired incentive mechanisms and analyzed
them while pointing out their advantages and drawbacks.
Interestingly, many works have proposed curious schemes
to encourage nodes to cooperate. For example, the authors
in [4] used evolutionary games theory and addressed how
a reward mechanism could efficiently induce cooperation
among relay nodes in delay tolerant networks. The authors in
[2] suggested a simple reward-based mechanism scheme, and
show how the source could optimally set the reward value
based on the relays information.
In [14], a repeated game is constructed in order to capture
the interaction between mobile nodes in terms of non-
cooperative power control. The authors in [18] introduced the
framework of satisfaction form of game to model the problem
of QoS provisioning in decentralized networks, and they
provided a comparison between the concept of Generalized
Nash Equilibrium (GNE) and the concept of Satisfaction
Equilibrium (SE). To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first work conducted to analyze distributed caching in DTNs
under quality of service constraints using satisfaction game
approach.
The main contribution of this paper is the design of a
new distributed framework for QoS provisioning in DTN-like
networks using the concept of satisfaction equilibrium and a
reward-based incentive mechanism. By offering some reward
(virtual coins) to relay nodes, the source node can efficiently
encourage them to use a part of their battery energy and
participate to forward a file to some given destination, i.e,
caching a given file and wait to find a persistent connection
with the interested destination. Within this framework, the
resulting distributed caching problem is investigated using the
powerful tool of non-cooperative game theory. Notice that
in this paper we use the concept of SE [22] as a solution
concept instead of the well-known Nash equilibrium concept.
Now, one needs not only a stable state of the game but also
providing certain performance requirements. More precisely,
the source has an specific problem which is offering a
minimum reward ensuring that the relays delivery probability
does not go bellow a threshold value, while the relays have
the choice to ”accept” or ”reject” this offer, depending on
the reward value whether it is beneficial or not. Next, we
exhibit sufficient conditions for existence of an SE for both
pure strategies and mixed strategies. Moreover, aiming to
understand the behavior of the DTN source-relay nodes
during the interaction and the eventual convergence to the
SE, we propose two stochastic algorithms for both the source
and the relay nodes.
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as
follows. In section II, we describe the problem, its formulation
and our solution design. In Section III, we present the game
theoretical model including, utility functions and the SE for-
mal definition. Section IV exhibits the satisfaction equilibria
computation and an analysis of their efficiency. Next, we
describe the stochastic learning algorithms adopted in Section
V. Section VI provides some numerical investigations and
simulation runs to claim our work and a conclusion is drawn
in Section VII.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a delay tolerant network including a pair
of source-destination, and n relay nodes. When a contact
between the source node and a relay node takes place, the
source transmits a data file to the relay node. Relay nodes,
moving independently in the network area, store the file,
carry it and wait until having a direct link opportunity with
the destination node to forward the file. We next list the
assumptions considered in this paper:
• The file to forward has a finite lifetime τ (called also
horizon) during which the destination is interested in its
content;
• For simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume
that all nodes are identical and equipped with the same
wireless interface;
• We consider that the relay nodes use a two-hop routing
policy [17], which works as follows: when a relay node
receives a copy of the file from the source, it stores it
and forwards it to the destination node when met within
the file’s lifetime. The choice of this routing protocol is
motivated by an energy efficiency purpose. Indeed such
a routing scheme has a good delivery/energy efficiency
trade-off;
• Occurrence of the contacts between any two nodes fol-
lows Poisson distribution. Thus, the time interval between
two successive contacts (inter-contact time) for each pair
of relay nodes is exponentially distributed with a pairwise
meeting rate λ ≥ 0. A comprehensive discussion of this
modeling can be found in [3] and [8]. We further consider
that the contact time is large enough for the complete
transmission of the source’s file.
The source-relay contact probability within the file’s life time
τ can be expressed as,
pc = p(t ≤ τ) =
∫ τ
0
λe−λtdt = 1− e−λτ . (1)
Each relar node can be in one of the three states: 1) listening
(sending beacons for discovery purposes), 2) transmitting
(when in contact with the destination), or 3) receiving data
from the source node. In this paper, we neglect the energy
consumption related to the discovery/listening state. Thus, the
energy consumption per node includes the energy consumed
during the receiving state (denoted er), the energy consumed
while transmitting the file to the destination (denoted et) and
the storing energy per time slot (denoted e). It follows that the
mean energy es dissipated while caching a file with lifetime
τ can be written as
es =
∫ τ
0
eλte−λtdt
= e
[
1− (1 + λτ)e−λτ
λ
]
=
e
λ
(1−Qτ ) . (2)
where Qτ denotes the probability that a given relay fails in
relaying a given file to the destination [1]. Hence, the total
energy consumption per node becomes η = er + et + es.
A. Problem Formulation and Solution Design
It is desirable that the nodes behave in a fully cooperative
fashion in order to maximize the overall delivery rate. How-
ever, in real deployments, the relay nodes may not cooperate
due to energy constraints and conflicting interests. Hence, a
degradation of the network performance may be observed. To
deal with this problem and encourage/force the relay nodes
to participate in the file forwarding game, we next develop a
reward-based incentive mechanism.
Fig.2 describes the interaction between the source node and
the relay nodes under the proposed rewarding mechanism. On
one hand, the source has the objective of making its file arrive
I am offering 
this reward  α(δ) to the first 
relay to deliver my file
Destination
Source
α?  / λ?,η?,τ?
should i accept?
α?  / λ?,η?,τ?
should i accept?
α?  / λ?,η?,τ?
should i accept?
Fig. 2. The Source-Relay interaction.
to destination during the file’s lifetime, so it generates a copy
of this file and attempts to convince the relays encountered
to forward it. On the other hand, the encountered relays can
either accept (strategy ‘a’) or reject (strategy ‘r’) caching and
relaying this file. In order for the long term average delivery
rate of the source files to be above some given threshold
(minimum QoS), the source needs to determine the appropriate
reward to offer to the cooperating relays. When a source-
relay contact occurs, the rational relay nodes seek to pick a
strategy that maximizes its own payoff. In the meantime, the
source offers the reward value merely to satisfy an individual
constraint which consists of reaching a delivery rate higher
that some threshold δ. Moreover, when a relay node declines
the forwarding offer or fails to reach the destination within
the file’s lifetime, it incurs a penalty in the form of a regret
of declining or failing. In the next section, we construct a
game theoretic framework to capture the performance of the
proposed reward-based mechanism.
III. GAME THEORETICAL MODEL
Game theory has been used to solve problems in ad hoc,
fixed and cellular networks. It is a powerful tool for the
analysis of distributed networks. Its equilibrium concept and
formulation of the utility function under constraints permit
to study the system behavior and its decision strategies. It
is mainly used to study the decision-making by the system
through an equilibrium analysis. Indeed, in this section we
first formulate our case of DTN as a homogeneous One-Shot
caching Game, where the source and relays are selfish players
playing independently and simultaneously. The source’s strat-
egy is the choice of the continuous-valued reward α, taken
from the interval [0, αmax], and the relays have two discrete
strategies accept ’a’ or reject ’r’. Then, we present the utility
function which considers the proposed reward mechanism,
the energy consumption, the delivery probability and the
regret values. Next, we study the existence and uniqueness of
equilibria in pure game when the players choose to play their
pure strategies and in mixed game when they independently
and randomly select their strategies; in the mixed game, each
player (i.e. each relay in contact with the source) accepts with
probability p ∈ [0, 1] or reject with 1 − p. Later, we give
the conditions driving the system to an operating/stable point,
namely a Satisfaction Equilibrium [16].
In fact, according to the game’s concept, each player’s
action/strategy corresponds to a certain utility. Rationally,
when a relay receives a file from the source, its utility depends
on the choice of other relays’ strategies. As mentioned above,
the relays ’meet’ the source with probability pc and all arrivals
are independent. Therefore, the average number of relays
among n which are in contact with the source is n˜ = npc.
Further, according to [1], we define φi(n˜) the delivery
probability that a given relay i among n˜, plays pure strategy
’a’ and succeeds to deliver a given file ( i.e., the first to deliver
the file to the destination) as
φi(n˜) = (1− qτ )
n˜∑
j=1
(
n˜− 1
j − 1
)
(1 − qτ )n˜−1qn˜−jτ
j
=
1− qn˜τ
n˜
. (3)
Next, we will formulate the utility function for each player.
A. Utilities Formulation
We define the utility function of each relay as the difference
between the reward that it can win from the source and the
energy consumed to cooperate with the source. Thus, we
denote Ui(’a’, α, , na) the utility function of a given relay
when it plays its pure strategy accept ’a’, and Ui(’r’, α, , na)
when it plays its pure strategy reject ’r’.

Ui(’a’, α, na) = αφi(na)− σ(1− φi(na))− η
Ui(’r’, α, na) = −αφi(na)− γ
(4)
where σ and γ are appropriate constants (regrets) that the
relay incurs when it accepts to cache a given file but it does not
succeed to deliver it during its lifetime and when it declines
the source offer respectively. na denotes the number of relays
out of n˜, that are have been in contact with the source and
that accepted to cache .
Furthermore, because of the selfish behavior, each relay
decision is based on self-optimisation; the relay’s objective
is then to maximize its own utility in a distributed fashion,
i.e.
max
v∈{a,r}
Ui(’v’, α, na), ∀i = 0, 1, · · · , na.
The utility function of source Us(’a’, , na) is merely the
delivery probability of all relays that have accepted caching.
Us(’a’, na) = naφi(na), ∀i = 0, 1, · · · , na.
B. Satisfaction Equilibrium
Now, we present a definition for the Nash Equilibrium [16],
which is the point where no player can improve his payoff
by making individual changes in his decisions. Precisely, in
our source-relays game we introduce an equilibrium called
satisfactory equilibrium [22]: the source seeks to satisfy the
constraint that its ’well-being’ should be greater than a fixed
value (threshold), given the strategies adopted by the relays,
which behave rationally to maximize their “well-being” by
playing their optimal strategies.
Definition 1. At satisfaction Nash equilibrium (p∗, α∗) we
have,
E[Us(’a’, n)] ≥ δ, ∀α ∈ [0, αmax],
and
p∗ ∈ arg max
p∈[0,1]
E[Ui(p, α∗, n)], ∀i = 0, 1, · · · , na.
Next, we will perform a thorough analysis of SE, its exis-
tence and uniqueness in pure an mixed strategies. Moreover,
we discuss the full conditions that drive our distributed system
to this steady point, if there exists one.
IV. SATISFACTION EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
We analyze here the structure of the content caching game
solutions and we derive many sufficient conditions for the
existence of a SE.
Theorem 1. (Nash’s Theorem [16]) Every finite game in
strategic form (i.e., with finite number of players and finite
number of pure strategies for each player) has at least one
Nash equilibrium (NE) (involving pure or mixed strategies).
Since the condition α(δ) is imposed on the game, the NE
is not a suitable solution. Along this paper we replace the
Nash equilibrium by the Satisfaction Equilibrium which is
more natural.
Remark 1. We highlight that the existence of pure / mixed SE
does not necessarily imply its uniqueness. In fact, the existence
of the constraint α(δ) yields the fact to provide conditions to
have a unique SE very difficult.
A. Pure Satisfaction Equilibria (PSE)
We turn now to derive the Satisfaction Equilibria for pure
strategy case. The players act with their pure strategies.
Lemma 1. The content caching game may have numerous
PSE. Satisfaction Equilibria are any (α∗, n∗a) solutions of the
following two conditions:
n∗a ≥
log(1− δ)
log(qτ )
(5)
and,
α∗ =
λσ(n − 1 + qnaτ )− na(λ(γ − er − et)− e(1− qτ ))
2λ(1− qnaτ ) .
(6)
Proof. Assume that the profile J =
(
na︷ ︸︸ ︷
’a’, ’a’, ..., ’a’,
n−na︷ ︸︸ ︷
’r’, ’r’...., ’r’) is a satisfaction equilibrium.
Then

Ui(’a’, α, na) ≥ Ui(’r’, α, na), ∀i = 0, 1, · · · , na
Ui(’a’, α, na) ≤ Ui(’r’, α, na), ∀i = 0, 1, · · · , n− na
Hence, the relays are indifferent between the two strategies
’a’, ’r’, then
Ui(’a’, α
∗, na) = Ui(’r’, α∗, na),
φi(na)− σ(1− φi(na))− η = −αφi(na)− γ.
After a few lines of algebra, we find
α∗ =
λσ(n− 1 + qnaτ )− na(λ(γ − er − et)− e(1− qτ ))
2λ(1− qnaτ ) .
The source problem consists of assuring a succeed relays’
probability value
naφ
i(na) ≥ δ,
then,
1− qnaτ ≥ δ, =⇒ n∗a ≥
log(1 − δ)
log(qτ )
The pure equilibrium could fail to achieve a certain lucidity
between relay nodes since only a part of relays may accept to
cache the file. To solve this problem, we use another concept of
equilibrium, named Mixed Satisfaction Equilibrium, in which
the relay will accept to cache the file with some probability.
B. Mixed Satisfaction Equilibria (MSE)
When mixed strategy is allowed, the relays randomize
between accepting and rejecting the source offer according to
common probability distribution, accepting with p, rejecting
with 1− p.
Lemma 2. The satisfactory caching game has infinitely many
Mixed Satisfaction Equilibria (α∗, p∗). They are solutions of
the following system:

α∗ = λσ(n−1+(1−(1−qτ )pcp
∗)n)−n(λ(γ−er−et)−e(1−qτ ))
2λ(1−(1−(1−qτ )pcp∗)n) .
p∗ ≥ 1− n
√
1−δ
(1−qτ )pc (7)
Proof. At the equilibrium each relay is indifferent about which
strategy to choose. Namely
Ui(’a’, α∗, n) = Ui(’r’, α∗, n),
α∗φi(n)− σ(1− φi(n)) − η = −α∗φi(n)− γ, (8)
where
φi(n) = z
n∑
j=1
(
n− 1
j − 1
)
zn−1(1− z)n−j
j
=
1− (1− z)n
n
,
with z = pcp(1− qτ ). Next, after some algebras from (8) we
obtain
α∗ =
λσ(n − 1 + (1− z∗)n)− n(λ(γ − er − et)− e(1− qτ ))
2λ(1− (1− Z∗)n) .
(9)
where z∗ = (1− qτ )pcp∗.
At Nash equilibrium, The source’s objective is
nφi(n) ≥ δ, (10)
then
n
1− (1− (1− qτ )pcp∗)n
n
≥ δ, (11)
after some algebras we obtain,
p∗ ≥ 1−
n
√
1− δ
(1 − qτ )pc (12)
From now on, we refer to the case of strict equality as
the Efficient Satisfaction Equilibrium (ESE). Indeed this point
correspond to the minimum satisfaction level (QoS threshold)
of the source node which means there will be no incentive for
the source node to deviate unilaterally. This also correspond
to a minimum stable accepting probability such that the whole
source and relay nodes have no incentive to change their
decision.
C. Efficient Satisfaction Equilibria (ESE)
This section exhibits some properties of the efficient sat-
isfaction equilibrium defined in the previous subsection. We
consider and extend the Pareto-efficiency [23],[6] as criterion
to discuss and investigate its efficiency. Notice that the ESE
is not always Pareto optimal.
Definition 2. A equilibrium is said to be strongly Pareto-
optimal, if no player’s payoff can be increased without de-
creasing the payoff of another player, i.e. ∄(p’, α’), such
∀i ∈ n,E(Ui(p’, α’, n)] ≥ E[Ui(p∗, α∗, n)]
and ∃j ∈ n,E(Uj(p’, α’, n)] > E[Uj(p∗, α∗, , n)]
Proposition 1. The ESE of the induced non-cooperative,
symmetric One-shot caching game is Pareto optimal.
Proof. In order to prove the strong Pareto-optimality, it is
enough to show that for any couple (p’, α’) no strictly higher
payoff can be obtained, without decreasing the payoff of other
players. Let us, assume that ∃(p’, α’) such as,{
p’ = βp∗, β > 1
α’ = ψα∗, 0 < ψ < 1
The meaning of this configuration: The source could increase
its utility, if reward value decreases and the acceptance prob-
ability increases so,
E(Us(p’, n)] = 1− (1 − (1− qτ )pcp’)n
= 1− (1 − (1− qτ )pcβp∗)n
> 1− (1− (1 − qτ )pcp∗)n
⇐⇒ E(Us(p’, n)] > E(Us(p∗, n)]
, i.e., the configuration increases the well-being of the source.
However, this configuration can also decrease the well-being
of the relays
E(Ui(p’, α’, n)) = p’D(p’, na)Ui(’a’, α’, na)
+(1− p’)D(p’, na)Ui(’r’, α’, na) < E(Ui(p∗, α∗, n)),
with D(p’, na) =
∑n−1
na=0
(
n−1
na
)
p’na(1− p’)n−na−1
We cannot improve the utility of the source without decrease
the relays’ utility, which contradicts the Pareto optimal defini-
tion. Consequently, the ESE is strong Pareto optimality.
V. LEARNING ALGORITHMS
In this, we present our proposal learning algorithms to
attend the ESE discussed in previous section. In fact, we
will give a formally description of the two Stochastic learn-
ing algorithm. Indeed, the stochastic learning technique has
been successfully used in Distributed system, particularly in
wireless networks. Briefly, At each iteration, the automatons
uses only the estimated value of their payoff to update their
action value till converge to their unique best response. Indeed,
the source’s strategy is a independent, continue action which
is select a reward value α ∈ [0, αmax], based on local
observations, satisfying that the file-caring-relays succeed with
probability greater then δ. Precisely, the source does not need
the strategies of the relays, it observes only its own payoff
and its reward value assigned. Consequently, we propose a
satisfactory stochastic learning algorithm based on [20] which
will lead the source to its optimal decision.
Algorithm 1: Source satisfactory equilibrium stochastic
learning algorithm
Result: Satisfaction equilibrium reward value α∗
1 Initialization;
2 Assign a value for α ∈ [0, αmax].
3 Expected payoff µ∗.
4 Learning pattern: For each iteration k
5 Observe the estimate value of payoff Uˆs
Uˆs
k+1
= Uˆs
k
+ ǫk+1(µ
∗ − Uˆsk)
αk+1 = max(min(αmax, α+ ǫk+1(µ
∗ − Uˆs
k+1
)), 0)
As regards the relays which will take the decision locally
and independently based their probability distribution, accord-
ing to reward value αˆ estimated by source, so we propose
imitative COmbined fully DIstributed PAyoff and Strategy
(CODIPAS) [21]. This choice of CODIPAS is justified by
its functionality such as, the player only need to observe the
realization of their utility during previous iterations. They play
independently their strategies based on the outdated observa-
tion. where ek is the unit vector with the ith component unity
corresponding to the action selected at k
VI. NUMERICAL INVESTIGATIONS
We present here some numerical examples evaluating the
performance of our contributions. We consider the following
setting: δ = 0.21, σ = 0.2 , γ = 0.15 , e = 3.8 × 10−5,
er = 2 × 10−5 et = 2 × 10−5, αmax = 5, n = 7, and we
depict the behaviour of the source node and the relay nodes
while varying the horizon τ (file lifetime), the parameter λ
Algorithm 2: Imitative CODIPAS
1 Initialization:;
2 for each relay i ∈ n do
3 Uˆai,0, Uˆ
r
i,0, pi,0
4 Define the sequence up to T : Mai,k,M ri,k, Lai,k, Lri,k for
k ∈ {1, ...., T }.
5 Learning pattern: for each relay i ∈ n do
Uˆai,k+1 = Uˆ
a
i,k+1 +M
a
i,kei,k(Ui,k − Uˆai,k)
Uˆ ri,k+1 = Uˆ
r
i,k+1 +M
a
i,k(1− ei,k)(Ui,k − Uˆ ri,k)
pi,k+1 =
pi,k(1 + L
a
i,k)
Uˆai,k
pi,k(1 + Lai,k)
Uˆa
i,k + (1− pi,k)(1 + Lri,k)Uˆ
r
i,k
that stands for the contact rate and the number of the relay
nodes participating in transmission.
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Fig. 3. Reward value and acceptance probability as function of file lifetime
and contact rate
We depict in Fig.3 (a) and Fig.3 (b) the acceptance proba-
bility and the reward value while varying the file lifetime for
several values of the contact rate at SE. We notice that the relay
nodes are cooperative and assist the file forwarding while the
source offers high value of reward. Namely, the relay nodes
tend to accept with probability 1. However, when the source
decreases the reward the relay nodes decrease automatically
their probability to cooperate, which is quite intuitive. This can
be explained by the behaviour of the source and relays nodes,
such as the source objective is offering minimum value of
reward and ensuring its constraint to attain desired delivery
probability δ , while the relay nodes have a problem of
trade-off between the reward offered, energy and file lifetime.
Indeed, the relay has benefit to accept caching the file as its
expected lifetime and the probability to contact the destination
are low, because the source is willing to give high value of
reward.
Fig.4 (a) and Fig.4 (b) show the impact of the number of
relay nodes on the acceptance probability for different value of
file lifetime and contact rate at SE, this probability decreases as
the number of relays increases because the existence of several
opponent can decrease the delivery probability of each relay
nodes, hence their acceptance probability decreases afraid of to
accept and fail to delivery and incur a punishment. Moreover,
the influence of λ and τ is illustrated. Acceptance probability
decreases as long as λ, τ increase, this can be easily explained
by the reward offered by the source node which tries to
minimum the reward value, then as λ, τ increase this value
of reward is not more beneficial, so it does not cover the
transmission cost of the relays. Consequently, they relays tend
to not cooperate.
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Fig. 4. Acceptance probability as function of number of relays, file lifetime
and contact rate
We depict in Fig.5 (a) the delivery probability as function
of the file lifetime and contact rate at SE, the figures illustrate
the satisfaction regions where the source attains its objective,
so while increasing the file lifetime the delivery probability
increases till converges to the desired value δ. Hence, for each
value of file lifetime λ(τ) corresponds a value of contact rate
λ(τ∗) where the satisfaction regions of source begin. The same
remark for the contact rate in Fig.5 (b) for each value of file
lifetime τ(λ) corresponds a value of contact rate τ(λ∗) where
the satisfaction regions of source begin.
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Fig. 5. Delivery probability as function of file lifetime and contact rate
In Fig.6 we consider a scenario involving seven relays with
symmetric contact rate and file lifetime λ = 0.015, τ = 100.
In fact, this figure depicts the behavior of the proposed
learning algorithms over time and how they converge to the
pure SE, such as Fig.6 (a) shows the convergence of the
source satisfactory equilibrium stochastic learning algorithm
to the optimal reward value α∗. The Fig.6 (b) stands for the
convergence of the relays algorithm (Imitative CODIPAS) to
the pure optimal acceptance probability p∗ ∈ {0, 1} and the
Fig.6 (c) shows the number of relays that accept to cache, i.e
the number of relay that play the pure action ”accept”.
Moreover, in Fig.7 we considered a scenario including
three relays with symmetric contact rate and file lifetime
λ = 0.015, τ = 100 and source with with different target value
of delivery probability δ ∈ {0.02, 0.48, 0.65, 0.85}. Hence, the
Fig.7 (a) illustrates the convergence of the source satisfactory
equilibrium stochastic learning algorithm to the optimal reward
value α∗ that it is willing to offer for the purpose that the relays
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Fig. 6. Seeking the pure Satisfaction Equilibrium
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Fig. 7. Seeking the mixed Satisfaction Equilibrium
accept to cooperate with high probability for different value
of δ. Whereas, the Fig.7 (b) shows the different acceptance
probability where the relays algorithm converge for different
value of reward. Precisely, the two algorithms converge in-
dependently and simultaneously to the symmetric pair vector
(α∗, p∗) for each value of target delivery probability desired
by the source.
VII. CONCLUSION
We investigated the support of QoS in DTN-like networks
under energy/reward trade-off. We formulated the interaction
between a source node and a set of relay nodes as a non-
cooperative satisfaction game. Full satisfaction equilibria char-
acterization for both pure and mixed strategies were provided.
Then, we proposed two fully distributed learning algorithms to
guarantee discovery of the source/relays satisfactory strategies
without knowledge of any external information. The SE en-
sures to the source node to meet its target delivery probability
while maximizing the payoff functions of the relay nodes.
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